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Effectiveness of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism in 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Agreements in Agriculture and Forestry 
 







  This  study  explores  the  conditions  under  which  a  trade  sanction  can  be  an  effective 
enforcement mechanism used by the US against China in global greenhouse (GHG) mitigation in 
agriculture and forestry. The problem has the structure of prisoner’s dilemma and hence both the 
US and China have incentive to free-ride in GHG emissions abatement. It is found that if the US 
joined the rest of the world (ROW) in emissions abatement in agriculture and forestry, the US 
could also convince China to comply with abatement using trade sanctions. In this study, trade 
sanctions are considered as a deterrent to free-riding. For threats of trade sanctions to become a 
viable enforcement mechanism tariff rates have to achieve two conditions defined in this study: 
credibility and effectiveness. In a scenario where China is the only region refusing to implement 
an emissions tax on its GHG from agricultural and forestry sectors it is shown that there may be 
a  window  in  which  trade  sanctions  constitute  a  viable  enforcement  mechanism  for  the 
environmental agreement. This window is depicted by tariff rates below 9% (these rates achieve 
credibility) and above an increasing lower bound (denoting rates achieving effectiveness). The 
lower bound intersects 9% at a carbon tax of $80/TCE implying that; 1) at carbon taxes above 
$80/TCE trade sanctions are no longer a viable enforcement mechanism for the environmental 
agreement, and 2) the viability of trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism may be limited 
to a certain level of targeted abatement. 
   3 
 
Introduction 
The  Emissions  Gap  Report  (UNEP,  2010)  by  the  United  Nations  Environment 
Programme  shows  that  the  1997  Kyoto  Protocol  will  not  be  as  effective  as  expected  in 
moderating climate change. This is an expected result considering the fact that the US and China, 
the two largest contributors to the global  greenhouse  gas (GHG) emissions
1, are  yet to take 
action aimed at curbing their emissions. China is not abating its emissions because the Kyoto 
protocol exempts China and other developing countries (called non-Annex 1 countries) from 
abatement  responsibilities.  The  US,  on  the  other  hand,  decided  not  to  commit  to  the  treaty 
because
2;  1)  it  exempts  the  non-Annex  1  countries,  including  China
3  and  2)  it  lacks  an 
enforcement mechanism that would be effective in guaranteeing compliance from developing 
countries once they are required to curb emissions themselves.  
Barrett (2003) posited the lack of enforcement mechanism within the Kyoto protocol as a 
central reason of its ineffectiveness. Since GHG emissions amount to a global public good (bad) 
then the Kyoto protocol (or any other international environmental agreement designed to curb 
GHG  emissions)  has  the  structure  of  the  well-known  prisoner’s  dilemma:  while  the  social 
optimum is achieved when all countries cooperate, all of them have individual incentives not to 
do so. If there is no enforcement mechanism that allows complying countries to effectively and 
credibly punish free riders then no cooperation can be sustained.  
Barrett (1997) also demonstrates that trade sanctions may provide a viable enforcement 
mechanism. Indeed trade sanctions have been effectively used as an enforcement mechanism to 
control  Ozone  Depleting  Substances  (ODS).  Countries  signed  the  Montreal  Protocol  which 
employed trade restrictions and threats to ban trade in ODS and ODS-containing products with 
                                                           
1 See McKibbin (2008). 
2 There may be other reasons but these have, in general, been considered the most relevant ones in the literature. 
3 See Owen and Hanley (2004), pg: 67. 4 
 
non-parties as an enforcement mechanisms. Although the two problems, i.e., control of the ODSs 
and  the  GHG  mitigation,  have fundamental  differences
4, herein  it  is  hypothesized  that trade 
sanctions  may  constitute  an  effective  enforcement  mechanism  to  sustain  compliance  in  the 
context of agreements to curb global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Like Barrett (1997), in 
this study, trade sanctions are considered as a deterrent to free-riding. 
It has been estimated that over one third of global carbon emitted since 1850 is related 
with agricultural and deforestation activities (Houghton, 2003). Furthermore, approximately 50% 
of the global methane emissions (CH4) and 75% of the global nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are 
coming from land-related agricultural activities (USEPA, 2006). Therefore, an attempt to tackle 
the  problem  of  GHG  emissions  related  to  agricultural  and  forestry  activities  may  provide  a 
solution  to  a  significant  portion  of  the  GHG  problem.  In  addition  trade  sanctions  may  be 
especially effective when it comes to GHG mitigation in the agricultural and forestry sector as 
these products are highly traded in international markets. 
As two of the world’s largest GHG emitters (in general and from agricultural sources), 
the US and China are critical players in this game and their actions so far are consistent with the 
result  of  a  prisoner’s  dilemma  game  without  an  enforcement  mechanism,  i.e.,  they  do  not 
mitigate  their  emissions.  Hence  it  seems  relevant  to  assess  the  potential  viability  of  trade 
sanctions as an enforcement mechanism capable of inducing, in particular, the US and China to 
cooperate in curbing emissions from agricultural and forestry. Trade sanctions are an effective 
enforcement tool as long as they fulfill two conditions: credibility and effectiveness of sanction 
threats. A threat is credible if and only if the punisher is better off applying the punishment to the 
                                                           
4 Barrett (2007) lists the differences between the two problems. One difference is that in depletion of the ozone layer 
problem, everyone on Earth is affected in same way, i.e., they all become worse off. In the global warming problem, 
on the other hand, different regions are affected by the problem in different ways, at least in the short term. For 
instance, while some regions become worse off because of sea level rise, some regions become better off with the 
help of agricultural activities becoming possible in those regions that used to be unqualified for such activities. 5 
 
non-complying  party.  In  addition,  a  threat  is  effective  if  the  punished  country  is  better  off 
complying  than  free  riding  and  receiving  the  punishment.  The  two  conditions  depend  on 
different payoffs. The former condition depends on the payoff of the punisher while the latter 
depends on the payoff of the punished country. While a threat may be credible it may not be 
effective or vice versa.  
In this study, the payoffs obtained by punisher and punished countries, and hence the 
credibility and the effectiveness of trade sanctions to mitigate global GHG emissions related with 
agricultural and forestry industries, are determined by using the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model (Golub 
et al., 2009). The abatement policy considered in this study is a carbon tax on output related 
emissions,  intermediate  input  related  emissions,  and  primary  input  related  emissions  in  the 
agricultural sectors and a subsidy on forest carbon sequestration. Given the stated reasons put 
forth by the US for not subscribing to the protocol, we assume the US will join the agreement as 
long as an enforcement mechanism is in place. We then determine the effectiveness of trade 
sanctions as a mechanism through which the US may or may not be able to induce China to 
comply with a carbon tax.  
Therefore the main structure of our model is as follows. A carbon tax is set by countries 
signing an international agreement including the US. The US uses threats of trade sanctions 
(import tariffs to products from China) to try to induce China to set the same carbon tax. If trade 
sanctions  are  both  credible  and  effective  then  it  is  expected  that  a  global  environmental 
agreement will be signed and complied with by the US, China, and the rest of the world. As the 
main  objective  of  this  study  is  to  assess  the  potential  effectiveness  of  trade  sanctions  as 
enforcement mechanism we aim at answering the following question: under what conditions is a 
threat of tariff by the US against China both credible and effective? 6 
 
Literature Review 
The existing studies of trade sanctions and international cooperation either utilize a static 
modeling framework (Barrett, 1997; Alpay, 2000) or Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models (Kemfert, 2004). Barrett (1997) considers trade sanctions as a deterrent to free-riding and 
the author shows how trade sanctions in a multilateral environment agreement (MEA) such as 
the Montreal Protocol can work as a credible threat to deter free-riding and sustain cooperation. 
Alpay (2000) uses a general equilibrium model with a game theoretic component to show under 
which conditions international trade can stimulate GHG mitigation.  
Kemfert (2004) investigates a mechanism which gives incentives to the biggest GHG 
emitter, the USA to reduce its GHG emissions. Kemfert, Lise and Tol (2004) study effects of 
international trade and carbon leakage
5 on countries’ coordination in GHG emissions mitigation 
efforts. In the first part of the work, the authors build their model which assumes that there are 
three determinants of the GHG abatement cost of a country: (1) its own abatement efforts, (2) 
other countries’ abatement efforts (because of carbon leakage), and (3) abatement costs of other 
countries (because of international trade). Since their analytical analyses give ambiguous results, 
the authors run simulations to estimate the effects of international trade and carbon leakage on 
carbon emissions efforts and cooperation between countries.  To run the simulations, the authors 
use WAGEM (Kemfert, 2000) which is a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
based on GTAP data of 1995. Among the 11 regions, it is assumed that only the US, EU, and 
Japan are involved with the GHG emissions mitigation problem and the rest of the regions which 
are dummy players do not abate their emissions. A total of 14 simulations are run which differ 
along two dimensions: number of participants (7 possibilities including full participation of all 
                                                           
5 See Elliott et al. (2010) for another recent study about carbon tax and leakage.  7 
 
three  regions,  single  region,  and  two  regions  out  of  three)  and  abatement  target  (reducing 
emissions by 10% or 20% in comparison to the base year emissions, 1990). The simulations, 
however, do not give crystal clear results because of limitations of the model like building a 
static  model  for  a  dynamic  problem,  or  considering  limited  number  of  regions  for  a  global 
problem. Nonetheless, the authors find that if spillover effects are driven by the abatement costs 
of other countries, then incentives to cooperate are as weak as if there were no spillovers at all. 
On the other hand, if spillover effects are driven by the abatement efforts of other countries, then 
incentives to cooperate are stronger than the case without spillovers.  
McKibbin et al. (2008) introduce a mechanism which is called the McKibbin-Wilcoxen 
Hybrid approach, to allow China both to grow and help prevent the tragedy of GHG commons, at 
the same time. Naghavi (2010) builds a model to investigate the effectiveness of trade sanctions 
in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) under the assumption that firms’ decision on 
location and governments’ environmental and trade policies are endogenous. The author finds 
that trade sanctions can be effective as long as the abatement requirement is not too stringent 
with respect to the marginal cost of emissions.   
A very recent study by Devarajan, Go, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2011) compares three 
different tax instruments achieving  reductions of CO2 emissions by 15% in South Africa. The 
instruments are  a direct tax on carbon emissions, a proxy tax on energy  commodities (coal, 
petroleum, and electricity) and a proxy tax on emission-intensive commodities. Unlike Fullerton 
(2001)  which  is  making  the  same  comparison,  Devarajan  et  al.  (2011)  include  preexisting 
distortions in the labor market of South Africa in their analysis. The authors find the following 
three results: (1) a direct tax on emissions causes the least welfare losses. (2) Welfare losses are 
very  sensitive  to  pre-existing  factor  market  distortions.  (3)  Three  tax  instruments  order  in 8 
 
different rank in terms of effects on equity from the rank they have in terms of welfare losses. 
Although, the proxy tax on energy commodities is the second best instrument in terms of the 
welfare loss effects, it is the least regressive one in terms of equity effects.  
McEvoy et al. (2008) experimentally investigate problems in maintaining compliance in 
stable coalitions. The authors’ theoretical  model suggest that introducing a  member-financed 
enforcement mechanism into a coalition may increase compliance and hence contribution to the 
public good. The authors test this hypothesis by running a series of experiments and they find 
that the experimental results reject the hypothesis that member-financed enforcement within a 
coalition increases contribution to the public good. Another result that the authors find is that 
increasing participation threshold decreases average contribution to the public good because of 
decrease in frequency of coalitions to occur. “Improving coalition formation and compliance 
within coalitions requires a higher participation threshold, perhaps full participation, and more 
stringent enforcement than suggested by theory.” 
In the climate change literature
6, there are two distinct approaches commonly used to 
determine how much action is needed to price or to control GHGs in the short-term and longer 
term in a global level. The first approach is the welfare maximizing emissions pricing approach 
which weights benefits and costs of slowing global warming and determine the optimal climate 
policy by comparing their welfare effects. The most popular studies in this field are William D. 
Nordhaus’  “DICE  Model” (Nordhaus, 1994)  Nicholas Stern’s  “Stern Review”  (Stern, 2007). 
Unlike other studies in the literature
7 the DICE model and Stern Review consider damages from 
extreme warming scenarios.  
                                                           
6 See Aldy et al. (2010) for a literature review.  
7 Fankhauser (1995), Mendelsohn and Williams (2004, 2007), Tol (1995, 2002).   9 
 
     The second approach in climate change literature is the cost-effectiveness approach which 
looks for the climate policy that minimizes the cost of mitigating GHG emissions to an ultimate 
target. The “bottom-up”, the “top-down” approaches
8 and their hybrids are the approaches used 
in the cost-effectiveness analyses.    
 
3. Simulations 
3.1. The GTAP-AEZ-GHG Model 
The  GTAP-AEZ-GHG  model  developed  by  Golub  et  al.  (2009)  is  used  to  quantify 
welfare changes associated with different combinations of strategies considered in our model. 
The  GTAP-AEZ-GHG  model  uses  the  cost-effectiveness  approach  and  is  built  to  analyze 
computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  estimates  of  global  land-use  and  GHG  abatement 
potential between 2000 and 2020. In the model, there are 24 sectors in three regions: USA, 
China, and the Rest of the World (ROW). The agricultural sectors in the model are Paddy Rice, 
Other Grains, Other Crops, Ruminants, and Non-Ruminant Livestock. The simulations are run in 
WinGEM and the equivalent variation (EV) is used to measure changes in the welfare of the 
regions.  
 
3.2. Methodology and Results 
The cost of abating a given quantity of GHG emissions in this context is depicted by the 
welfare loss associated with the imposition of a carbon tax that achieves that abatement goal. 
Increasing abatement levels will require higher carbon tax rates. Figure 1 displays welfare losses 
incurred by the US under increasing carbon tax rates under compliance and free riding by China. 
                                                           
8 See Burniaux et al. (2002) for a comparison of the bottom-up and top-down approaches.  10 
 
Results  suggest  that  marginal  abatement  cost  is  increasing.  They  also  seem  to  reveal  that 
abatement costs incurred by the US are reduced by compliance on the part of China. The latter is 
due to the fact that emissions taxes on agriculture and forestry in China always favor the US 
economy because emissions intensities of the US are relatively lower than China’s, especially in 
paddy rice and ruminant livestock production (Golub et al, 2009). Therefore, an emissions tax in 
those sectors in China reduces their supply increasing China’s food imports from the US leading 




Figure 1 – Equivalent Variation (EV) of the US over different carbon taxes when China 
free-rides and cooperates 
 
As denoted in Figure 1, free riding by China harms the US. Therefore the US will try to 
induce China to comply if it has an enforcement mechanism the implementation of which yields 
more benefits than costs. One such mechanism may be trade sanctions; i.e., the US declares that 
it is going to impose a certain rate of tariff rate on all tradable commodities imported from China. 
                                                           
9  Figure 1 reveals that the US is better off not imposing a tax regardless of China’s behavior. This is so because 
there are not benefits from abatement. By assuming the US is imposing a given tariff we are implicitly assuming that 


































However, while such a threat may benefit the US by enhancing terms of trade it may also reduce 
welfare by increasing the price paid by consumers for those commodities. The net effect on 
welfare will determine the credibility of this threat.   
We  verify  the  effectiveness  of  a  carbon  tax  on agriculture  and  forestry  by  initially
10 
assuming  that  the  global  carbon  price is $100 per  ton  of  carbon  equivalent (TCE)
11  and  by 
varying the tariff rate, at 1% increments. Figure 2 illustrates China’s EV for a range of tariff rates 
imposed by the US on the entire imports coming from China. As the US increases its tariff rate 
China’s EV decreases. However, when the US sets its tariff rate at 21%, China’s welfare loss due 
to abatement ($15,455 US million) becomes less than the welfare loss due to US tariff ($15,628 
US million). In other words, under the assumption that both ROW and USA are implementing 
abatement, US has to impose a tax of 21% on tradable goods imported from China in order to 
convince China for abatement. Figure 2 suggests that, with a carbon tax of $100 a ton, the tariff 
rate is not effective until it gets to 21%. 
 
Figure 2 - China's EV under USA tariff ($ US million) and $100/TCE carbon tax on 
agriculture and forestry   
                                                           
10  Since Golub et al. (2009) measure emissions mitigation potential of agricultural and forestry sectors for a carbon 
price equal to $100/TCE, we also initially set the carbon price equal to $100/TCE then look for a carbon price in 
which it is possible to find a tariff rate which is both credible and effective.  
11  To convert $ per ton of carbon to $ per ton of CO2, multiply by the ratio of molecular weights, 44/12=3.67, i.e., 































Under a carbon tax of $100 per ton, on the other hand, the 21% tariff is not a credible 
threat. This is illustrated by Figure 3. Figure 3 shows how USA’s EV changes with the tariff rate 
imposed on goods imported from China. At a 10% tariff rate, the total welfare loss in the US 
($4,632  US  million)  exceeds  the  welfare  loss  under  China  non-compliance  and  no  trade 
sanctions ($4,607 US million). This means that, any tariff rate above 10% would reduce the US 
welfare to a level even lower than the scenario without the tariff. Therefore, at a carbon tax of 
$100 per ton the set of tariffs that are both effective and credible is empty, meaning that trade 
sanctions do not constitute an effective enforcement mechanism. We illustrated this point with a 
carbon tax of $100 per ton which was used in previous simulations by Golub et al. (2009). 
However a carbon tax is not likely to be that high so is the set of credible and effective tariff 
rates also empty at lower tax levels? Changes in US welfare for different combinations of tariff 
rates and carbon taxes are depicted in Figure 4.  
 
 


































Figure 4 reveals that initial increases in tariffs for a given carbon tax increase 
point. After a certain level, however, additional increases in the tariff rate start to reduce 
addition increases in the level of the carbon tax decrease EV at an increasing rate which is 
consistent with increasing marginal abatement cost de
depicted by Figure 4 needs to be compared with 
carbon tax levels, a zero tariff rate, and non
 
Figure 4 – Carbon Tax, Tariff Rates, and US 
 
After finding that there is no credible
other carbon prices are studied and it is found that 
effective becomes non-empty at carbon taxes
possible  to  find  a  credible  and  effective 
$80/TCE. It is found that an $80/TCE carbon price causes USA and China to lose $2.809B USD 
and $8.308B USD, respectively. If China rejects abatement and chooses to free
1 30 60 90 23 25
Figure 4 reveals that initial increases in tariffs for a given carbon tax increase 
point. After a certain level, however, additional increases in the tariff rate start to reduce 
addition increases in the level of the carbon tax decrease EV at an increasing rate which is 
consistent with increasing marginal abatement cost depicted by Figure 1. 
depicted by Figure 4 needs to be compared with the EV in the US associated with 
carbon tax levels, a zero tariff rate, and non-compliance by China.  
Carbon Tax, Tariff Rates, and US Equivalent Variation (EV)
After finding that there is no credible and effective tariff rate at $100/TCE carbon price, 
other carbon prices are studied and it is found that the set of tariff rates that are both credible and 
empty at carbon taxes at or below $80/TCE. In other words, it is always 
and  effective  tariff  rate  as  long  as  carbon  taxes  do  not  exceed 
$80/TCE. It is found that an $80/TCE carbon price causes USA and China to lose $2.809B USD 















Figure 4 reveals that initial increases in tariffs for a given carbon tax increase EV up to a 
point. After a certain level, however, additional increases in the tariff rate start to reduce EV. In 
addition increases in the level of the carbon tax decrease EV at an increasing rate which is 
picted by Figure 1. The welfare surface 
the EV in the US associated with different 
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tariff rate at $100/TCE carbon price, 
the set of tariff rates that are both credible and 
In other words, it is always 
tariff  rate  as  long  as  carbon  taxes  do  not  exceed 
$80/TCE. It is found that an $80/TCE carbon price causes USA and China to lose $2.809B USD 













welfare loss is only $336M USD but USA’s welfare loss will be $3.175B USD. It is found that to 
convince China to implement abatement, at $80/TCE carbon price level, the US would have to 
impose a 9% tariff rate on all China’s tradable goods. Under such a trade sanction, even though 
China is free-riding, its welfare loss reaches $8.310B USD (higher than $8.308B USD which is 
the cost of compliance) while USA’s welfare loss becomes $2.692B USD (lower than $3.175B 
USD which is the cost of not implementing the trade sanction). Therefore, while a 9% tariff rate 
makes China worse off than complying with abatement (making it an effective threat), its cost to 
USA is not as high as letting China free-ride (making it a credible threat). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Credible and Effective Tariff Rates 
 
In  figure  5,  the  combinations  of  tax  and  tariff  rates  above  the  blue  line  achieve 
effectiveness; i.e. China is better off complying and avoiding the trade sanction than free riding 
and being punished. Combinations below the red line achieve credibility; the US is better off 
implementing the trade sanction than not implementing it when China is free riding. Therefore 






























Set of Credible and Effective 
Trade Threats 15 
 
combinations that achieve both credibility and  effectiveness at the same time. The blue line 
intersects the red line at the point where carbon tax is $80/TCE and tariff rate is 9% meaning that 
tariff rates of up to 9% will be credible and effective threats when carbon price is less than or 
equal to $80/TCE. Note however that as the price of carbon increases the set of credible and 
effective threats becomes smaller until the price of carbon reaches $80/TCE at which point the 
set  becomes  empty.  Therefore  our  results  suggest  that  there  might  be  a  trade-off  between 
abatement level targeted and self-enforcement of an international environmental agreement. As 
the abatement target increases an increasingly smaller set of tariff rates achieve both credibility 
and effectiveness.  
 
5. Conclusion 
As the two largest GHG emitters, the US and China are two major players in the game of 
GHG  mitigation.  The  game  of  GHG  mitigation  between  the  US  and  China  is  a  standard 
prisoner’s dilemma with the current situation being the expected one: neither region abates its 
emissions. In this study, under the assumption that the US abates its emissions along with ROW 
(the rest of the world but China), it is investigated under what conditions trade sanctions become 
an effective tool to deter China from free-riding, i.e. to have China agree to abatement.  
For threats of trade sanctions to become a viable enforcement mechanism tariff rates have 
to achieve two conditions defined in this study: credibility and effectiveness. In a scenario where 
China is the only region refusing to implement an emissions tax on its GHG from agricultural 
and forestry sectors it is shown that there may be a window in which trade sanctions constitute a 
viable enforcement mechanism for the environmental agreement. This window is depicted by 
tariff  rates  below  9%  (these  rates  achieve  credibility)  and  above  an  increasing  lower  bound 16 
 
(denoting  rates  achieving  effectiveness).  The  lower  bound  intersects  9%  at  a  carbon  tax  of 
$80/TCE implying that; 1) at carbon taxes above $80/TCE trade sanctions are no longer a viable 
enforcement mechanism for the environmental agreement, and 2) the viability of trade sanctions 
as an enforcement mechanism may be limited to a certain level of targeted abatement.  
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